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RECENT CASES
PERSONAL JURISDICTION: AN EFFECTS TEST
RECOGNITION AND A KNOWLEDGE
REQUIREMENT IN MISSOURI'S CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMIT LONG-ARM STATUTE
State ex rel. Sperandio v. Clymer' (Sperandio II)
In 1967, Sperandio, a Missouri resident suffering from pain in his hip,
consulted Drs. Michael and Yancey. They diagnosed his condition as a
sublaxation of the femoral heads resulting from a hip deformity, and
recommended surgery.
Dr. Pemberton was an expert orthopedic surgeon, residing in Utah. He
specialized in the "Pemberton Procedure," a surgical operation he had
developed to correct conditions similar to the one experienced by Speran-
dio. Although Dr. Pemberton originally had developed this procedure for
children, he had successfully performed it in a modified version upon
several adults.
Having heard Dr. Pemberton lecture about this procedure, Dr.
Michael wrote to Pemberton soliciting his opinion as to whether Sper-
andio's condition required this operation and requesting instruction for
the modified adult procedure. X-rays of the hip were enclosed. One week
later, Dr. Pemberton replied. He concurred in Dr. Michael's diagnosis,
described the adult technique and its success, indicated post-operative
care, and requested further correspondence should the operation be at-
tempted. No such correspondence was forthcoming.
The operation was performed by Drs. Michael and Yancey. Not sat-
isfied with the results, Sperandio filed a medical malpractice suit against
the three doctors in 1975.2 Pemberton's motion to dismiss, based on his
contention that the court lacked personal jurisdiction,3 was sustained by
Judge Clymer. Sperandio petitioned the Missouri Supreme Court for a
writ of mandamus commanding Judge Clymer to exercise personal juris-
diction over Pemberton.4 An alternative writ issued. The writ was made
1. 581 S.W.2d 377 (Mo. En Banc 1979).
2. Sperandio's original suit, filed in 1969, was dismissed on January 3,
1975. The 1975 suit consisted of two counts. The first, a medical malpractice
action, alleged that Pemberton negligently failed to instruct the two performing
doctors in the technique of the operation. The second alleged a conspiracy among
the doctors to prevent Sperandio from learning his true condition.
3. A previous service of process on Pemberton was quashed because thedefendant's contact with Missouri was insufficent to establish personal juris-
diction. After a writ of mandamus failed, Sperandio again caused process to be
served on Pemberton in Utah. This time Pemberton appeared specially to con-
test jurisdiction contending that the matter was res judicata.
4. The proper method to challenge a lower court order is uncertain in
Missouri. Sperandio utilized a writ of mandamus; other cases have involved writs
of prohibition. See Peoples Bank v. Stussie, 536 S.W.2d 934 (Mo. App., St. L.
1980],
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peremptory in State ex rel. Sperandio v. Clymer5 (Sperandio 1) when the
court found sufficient contact between Pemberton and Missouri to es-
tablish personal jurisdiction.
The United States Supreme Court granted Pemberton's petition for
a writ of certiorari. The Court vacated the Sperandio I judgment 6 and
remanded the case "for further consideration in light of . . . [Kulko
v. Superior Court]."7 Following these vague instructions the Missouri
Supreme Court in Sperandio 1I reversed its earlier position, found in-
sufficient defendant-forum contacts, and quashed the alternative writ for
lack of personal jurisdiction.
Sperandio II, in holding that "Kulko does not announce new law,"8
illustrates that the minimum contacts test, as "any standard that requires
a determination of 'reasonableness,' . . . is not susceptible of mechanical
application."9 Thus, two opposite conclusions, both unanimous decisions
by the Missouri Supreme Court, were reached on the same set of facts
within one year's time.
In order to elucidate the effect of these decisions upon the Missouri
law of personal jurisdiction, it is necessary to discuss the minimum con-
tacts test, its development, and its requirements. The minimum contacts
test is a major avenue through which a state acquires personal jurisdiction
over a defendant not found within its territorial borders. The test evolved
from a series of United States Supreme Court decisions which constitute
a framework for the doctrine of in personam jurisdiction.1 0 Jurisdiction is
1976). But see Empiregas, Inc. v. Hoover Ball & Bearing Co., 507 S.W.2d 657,
660 (Mo. 1974). In Empiregas, the lower court had quashed service and then
dismissed the petition. The court held that an appeal was proper. But see Farm-
land Indus., Inc. v. Elliott, 560 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977), where the
defendant argued that since the plaintiff had an adequate remedy by appeal,
mandamus was improper. The court refused to rule on the issue, stating that
it would be "wasteful of judicial resources to decline to proceed to a determina-
tion on the merits." Id. at 64.
5. 568 S.W.2d 935 (Mo. En Banc 1978).
6. Pemberton v. Sperandio, 439 U.S. 812 (1978).
7. Id. at 812. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). Mr. and
Mrs. Kulko were married in California during a three-day military layover.
They lived in New York until their separation in 1972. A separation agree-
ment provided that the children would live in New York with Mr. Kulko
except during summers when they would join their mother in California. The
divorce was obtained in Haiti. In 1973, the father consented to his daughter's
request to live in California. In 1975, without her ex-husband's consent, Mrs.
Kulko arranged to have the other child join her in California. She then brought
suit in California to increase the child support allowance and to obtain full
custody of the children. The California court upheld the claim to personaljurisdiction. The Supreme Court, applying International Shoe, reversed.
8. 581 S.W.2d at 382.
9. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978).
10. For a history of the personal jurisdiction doctrine, see Kalo, Jurisdiction
as an Evolutionary Process: The Development of Quasi In Rem and In Personam
Principles, 1978 DuKa L.J. 1147; Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process
Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts from Pennoyer to Denckla-
A Review, 25 U. CH. L. REv. 569 (1958); Developments in the Law: State Court
Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909 (1960).
[Vol. 45
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essential to a valid personal judgment." In its broadest sense, jurisdiction
establishes the power of the state through its judicial forums to create
legal interests that will be respected, recognized, and enforced in all
states.12 Judgments rendered with personal jurisdiction are afforded the
protection of the full faith and credit clause,' 3 while those rendered against
nonresident defendants without personal jurisdiction are void in the
rendering state and are subject to collateral attack.' 4
Jurisdiction has two basic requirements: an underlying foundation 5
and reasonable notice1 6 to the defendant that an action has been brought
against him.'7 Numerous methods have been created to establish the
requisite underlying foundation. Examples include presence,' 8 domicile,' 9
residence,2 0 citizenship,2 ' appearance,2 2 express consent,2 3 implied consent,24
11. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Pennoyer
v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732 (1877).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 42 (1971).
13. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
14. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980).
15. Foundation, as the word is used in this Note, refers to a relationship be-
tween the forum state and the defendant upon which a claim to jurisdiction
can be laid.
16. Notice consummates the establishment of personal jurisdiction. The
notice requirement is discussed in Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
See also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-15 (1950).
17. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978); Slivka v. Hackley, 418
S.W.2d 89, 91 (Mo. 1967); Apco Oil Corp. v. Turpin, 490 S.W.2d 400, 404 (Mo.
App., St. L. 1973).
18. Mere presence of the defendant within the state's borders is a sufficient
forum-defendant relationship upon which to establish jurisdiction. The fact that
the presence is temporary or transient is not controlling. McDonald v. Mabee,
243 U.S. 90, 91 (1916); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877); Grace v. Mac-
Arthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 446 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (process served upon defendant on
plane in air space over the forum state). See generally Ehrenzweig, The Transient
Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65
YAL L.J. 289 (1958).
19. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) (forum state has jurisdiction
over persons domiciled in the state but absent from it); Mo. R. Civ. P. 54.07(a).
20. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 54.07(a); RESTATFmNT (SECOND) OF CONFLcr OF
LAws § 80 (1971).
21. Hamill v. Talbott, 72 Mo. App. 22 (K.C. 1897). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFUmT OF LAws § 31 (1971).
22. Missouri recognizes the distinction between a general and a special ap-
pearance. In the former the plaintiff appears in the state to contest on the merits
while in the latter he appears to contest jurisdiction. This distinction developed
out of the anomalous situation that occurred when the defendant appeared to
contest jurisdiction but thereby subjected himself to service of process and juris-
diction predicated upon his presence. The distinction was an issue in Sperandio I1.
The court held that while Pemberton appeared in Missouri to move for a dis-
missal, he did not defend on the merits or recognize the court's jurisdiction. His
appearance was therefore special and could not be used as a foundation for
jurisdiction. 581 S.W.2d at 384. See also Germanese v. Champlin, 540 S.W.2d
109, 113 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976); Ballew v. Hawkins, 361 S.W.2d 852, 855
(Mo. App., Spr. 1962).
28. D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972); National
Equip. Rental v. Szunhent, 875 U.S. 311 (1964).
24. Implied consent is a fiction through which jurisdiction attaches. The
1980]
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doing business, 25 ownership of property within the state,28 and the minimum
contacts test. A foundation has been considered to be a justifiable means
upon which to establish jurisdiction if the foundation is based upon the
"presence" doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff,27 the recognized waiver concept
of consent, or the rationale of the minimum contacts test. The former two
groups can be classified as single factor foundations. 28 The mere existence
of the foundation, the single factor, was thought to be sufficient to es-
tablish jurisdiction.
The single factor foundations developed early. Eventually, criticism
of the "presence" foundations, which were based upon territorial concepts,
increased as international transportation and communication advanced.
Furthermore, an increased need developed to acquire jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants through means not allowed by the single factor
foundations. 29 Recognizing these developments, the Court in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington3O created the minimum contacts test. It
became the ultimate foundation by which a state may acquire personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. The test is flexible; it limits the
power of the forum state to impose jurisdiction only to the extent re-
quired by the due process clause. Thus, even if the defendant is not
present within the territory of the forum, jurisdiction still will exist if the
nonresident motorist statute is one example. The statute proclaims that the non-
resident has consented to jurisdiction and has assigned an agent, such as the
secretary of state, upon whom process can be served. See, e.g., Committee Reports,
23 j. Mo. BAR 569, 572 (1967), which discusses a study indicating that there are
at least 49 special classifications concerning the subject of service of process in
Missouri. Many of these are of the implied-consent type.
25. Doing business, presence, and implied consent are three theories- the
courts used to gain jurisdiction over foreign corporations before International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
26. Ownership of property is the basis for the various forms of in remjurisdiction.
27. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). The "presence" doctrine is based upon the premise
that the state's power to exert jurisdiction over persons within its boundaries is
plenary. Id. at 722. It follows that other foundations such as appearance, implied
consent, domicile, residence, and citizenship, for example, where the defendant
is either actually or fictionally found within the state's boundaries, would form
sufficient relationships for jurisdiction. But see Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: Per-
sonal Jurisdiction After Shaffer and Kulko and a Modest Prediction Regarding
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 20 Aviz. L. Racv. 861, 866 (1978),
where it was contended that the express and implied consent foundations should
be grouped together. That commentator also delineated a category based on
allegiance. See Blackmeyer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1931). Domicile,
residence, and citizenship would fall within the allegiance category.
28. The phrase "single factor" is borrowed from Vernon, Single-Factor
Bases of In Personam Jurisdiction: A Speculation on the Impact of Shaffer v.
Heitner, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 273, 277.
29. The contacts test is not the only way to reach defendants not found
within the state's borders. Implied consent, presence, doing business, and domicile
are other examples. Many of these methods, however, are rigid to apply and
have been subject to intense criticism because of their fictional nature. Out of
this criticism, the minimum contacts test evolved.
30. 326 U.S. 30 (1945).
[Vol. 45
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defendant has certain minimum contacts with the forum so that "the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions, of fair play and substantial
justice.' "31 While the Court in International Shoe did not disavow use
of the single factor foundations, their validity, especially after Shaffer v.
Heitner,3 2 is in doubt. Attacking one single factor foundation, ownership
of property within the forum state, the Court in Shaffer suggested the
vulnerability of several other foundations. 33
The actual analytical framework of the minimum contacts test is
difficult to ascertain. There must be a defendant-forum contact and a
nexus between that contact and the cause of action. If both of these con-
nections can be shown, their sufficiency is measured by a fairness test. If
either connection is so weak as to make it unfair to subject the defendant
to a suit in that state, the forum state will not be permitted to assert juris-
diction. In addition to the above constitutional factors which comprise the
minimum contacts test, compliance with the state law authorizing juris-
diction must be attained.
The plaintiff first must establish a connection between the defendant
and the forum state. The various kinds of contacts can be divided into
three categories: doing business in the state,3 4 performing an act in the
state,3 5 and performing an act outside the state which causes an effect
81. Id. at 816.
82. 488 U.S. 186 (1977).
83. The major distinction between the single factor foundations and the
minimum contacts test is that in the former no fairness test is required. Once
the factor is established and notice is conveyed to the defendant, jurisdiction is
automatic. When the minimum contacts test is employed, however, the focus
of jurisdictional inquiry is shifted from the individual's relationship to the
forum state to the reasonableness of that forum's assertion of jurisdiction over
the individual. The minimum contacts test may not be the only foundation that
requires a fairness test. RESTATE-MNT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAws §§ 30-31
(1971) would require a fairness test if the residence or citizenship foundations
were used. The Court in Shaffer held that quasi in rem jurisdiction was no
longer automatic but was subject to the minimum-contacts, fairness test approach.
488 U.S. at 207. The Court added, "We . . .conclude that all assertions of state-
court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in Inter-
national Shoe and its progeny." Id. at 212. Several commentators agree that if
Shaffer is read broadly, other "presence" jurisdictional foundations would fall
under a similar analysis. See Kalo, supra note 10, at 1189-91; Vernon, supra note
28, at 298; Woods, supra note 27, at 864-68; The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91
HARv. L. Rxv. 70, 159 (1977). But see Zammit, Reflections on Shaffer v. Heitner,
5 HAsr. CONST. L.Q. 15, 24 (1978), where the author suggests that the International
Shoe doctrine was limited to persons not present within the state. It therefore
is possible to argue that the mere presence of the defendant within the forum
alone is not sufficient to establish jurisdiction. In this situation a fairness test
may be required. The classification of the various foundations into the groups
discussed in note 27 and accompanying text supra, could then become critical. The
Shaffer doctrine may not apply to the consent group. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 488
U.S. 186, 216 (1977). Woods, supra note 27, at 865, further suggests that it would
not apply to the domicile category. For an in-depth discussion of Pennoyer, its
logic, and its eligibility for oblivion, see Hazard, A General Theory of State-
Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241.
84. RETATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFrLIcr OF LAws § 85 (1971).
85. Id. § 36.
1980]
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in the state.38 Logically, as one proceeds from the former to the latter, the
contact with the state becomes increasingly attenuated. Consequently, the
effects test constitutes what is presently the outside limits for a defendant-
forum contact. The test at least arguably meets due process standards,
gaining constitutional support from Hanson v. Denckla.3 7
Hanson noted that the defendant must perform an act through which
he "purposefully avails [him]self of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State."3 8 Application of the "purposeful" qualification
to the defendant's activity has caused numerous problems, especially in
product liability cases where a requirement of specific intent may be
dispositive. Several approaches to applying the "purposeful" language have
developed: treat it as passing language; interpret it narrowly; interpret it
to require mens Tea, either knowledge or foreseeability; or add it as a
factor in the fairness test.39
Regardless of the criticism of the Hanson purposeful contact require-
ment, the purposeful language was recognized in Kulko and Shaffer. World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 40 and Rush v. Savchuk,4 ' cases de-
cided subsequent to Sperandio II, have refined the Hanson contact re-
quirement. The Court in Woodson, noting that the defendant had no
contacts, ties, or relations with the forum state, and implying that the driv-
ing of a car into Oklahoma where a fortuitous accident occurred was a con-
tact based upon unilateral activity,42 held that there was not a sufficient
36. Id. § 37, which states that a "state has a natural interest in the effects
of an act within its territory even though the act itself was done elsewhere."
37. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
38. Id. at 253. See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct.
559, 565 (1980).
39. See Woods, supra note 27, at 871.
40. 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980). World-Wide was a New York corporation engaged
in a regional distributorship of vehicles and accessories. Its business activity was
confined solely to New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. The plaintiffs pur-
chased an Audi automobile from Seaway, a retail dealer connected only con-
tractually with World-Wide. While passing through Oklahoma, the plaintiffs were
injured in an accident, allegedly caused by a defective design. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court held jurisdiction to be proper. The United States Supreme Court,
with three judges dissenting, reversed.
41. 100 S. Ct. 571 (1980). The plaintiffs in Rush based their claim to juris-
diction over the defendant upon the attachment of a contractual debt owed to
the defendant's insurance company. The Court, following Shaffer, held that quasi
in rem jurisdiction was subject to a minimum-contacts test analysis. Applying that
test, the Court held the claim to jurisdiction invalid because there existed no con-
tacts, ties, or relations with the forum state. Id. at 580. The only alleged con-
nection was that the defendant's insurance company did business in the forum
state. The Court noted that while the presence of property within a state may
be the contact needed for jurisdiction, the fictitious notions concerning the situs
of intangible property can have no jurisdictional significance as a contact. Id.
at 581.
42. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559, 567 (1980).
The language used by the Court in Woodson revived the "ties and relation"
language of International Shoe. This language depicts a potentially broader con-
cept than "contact," which usually suggests a physical tie. See Woods, supra note
[Vol. 45
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forum-defendant contact. The failure to find a purposeful activity by the
defendant was. dispositive. In making this separate analytical determina-
tion, foreseeability was held to be relevant only in the sense that the de-
fendant's contact with the state should be such that he reasonably should
anticipate being haled into the courts of that state.43  o
*Even if a purposeful connection is shown, the plaintiff must show
that a nexus exists between the cause of action'and the contact. In applying
the minimum contacts test, absent a situation similar to that in Perkins v.
Benguet Consolidated Mining o.44 in which the business connection with
the state Was continuous and substantial,45 most states hold that due process
requires that personal jurisdiction be limited specifically to those claims
that arise out of the contact with the forum state.46
The fairness test qualifies the two factors considered above. This test
is one in which few answers will be written in black and white. "The greys
are dominant and even among them the shades are innumerable." 4 7
Weighing the facts on a case-by-case basis, the courts have established
numerous factors which they use to determine the reasonableness of re-
quiring a defendant to defend in the forum state.48
27, at 868-69. In Woodson, the Court rejected the argument that the defendant
would not earn revenue from sales in New York but for the fact, that the auto-
mobiles sold there could be used in states like Oklahoma.
43. 100 S. Ct. at 567. In finding no contact, the Court placed heavy reliance
upon the purposeful language qualification to the defendant's activity. The Court
distinguished product liability cases involving a chain of distributors where the
products are delivered into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they
will be purchased by the consumer.
44. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
45. The Court in Perkins held that if the business connection with the state
is continuous and substantial, jurisdiction will rest over causes of action not
related to the business done in the state. The Perkins analysis should be compared
with the approach discussed in Comment, The Cornelison Doctrine: A New Juris-
dictional Approach, 14 SAN DIEGo L. Rav. 458 (1977), discussing Cornelison v.
Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976). The Court held
that the cause of action did not arise out of the forum-defendant contact so as
to conform with the traditional requirement of specific jurisdiction. The Court
applied a broader "rational nexus" test, attaching jurisdiction to those claims
with a logical relationship to the forum. The commentator posed the following
hypothetical to illustrate the implications of this test. A Nebraska school teacher
vacations and goes to school each summer in California. While en route to
California, she injures a California resident in Arizona. Applying the test, juris-
diction could attach in California.
46. Bork v. Mills, 458 Pa. 228, 329 A.2d 247 (1974). The defendant, a Mary-
land resident engaged in a trucking business in an area that included Pennsyl-
vania, hit plaintiff in Virginia. Held: the cause of action did not arise out of the
contact with Pennsylvania, the forum state. See also Duflour v. Smith, 330 F.
Supp. 405 (D. Me. 1971). RSMo § 506.500(2) (1978) follows this approach by re-
quiring that the plaintiffs claim arise out of the defendant's connection with the
state. By endorsing a constitutional limit statute, the Sperandio decisions might
render this language meaningless. See notes 71-75 and accompanying text infra.
If so, the Cornelison approach, if accepted as within due process limits, may be
adopted in Missouri. See note 45 supra.
47. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948).
48. Factors used include the nature and quality of the contact, the quantity
19801
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The plaintiff also must show that state law authorizes the assertion of
jurisdiction. While the minimum contacts test provides the avenue
through which jurisdiction may be obtained, the state's long-arm statutes
provide the vehicle. These statutes cannot reach beyond the limits of due
process as defined by International Shoe, but they can impose stricter re-
quirements for establishing jurisdiction.4 9 Thus, attempts at obtaining
jurisdiction may satisfy the due process requirements but fail for lack of
compliance with state law.50 This problem is mitigated by those states
that establish equivalent statutory and due process limits.5 '
In applying the minimum contacts test, the label attached to the
connection with the state is very important. 52 This labeling procedure
of the contacts, the relationship of the claim to the forum state, the interests of
the forum state, foreseeability, the relative economic burden upon the parties,
the availability of alternative forums, the choice of law, the relative conveniences
of the parties, basic fairness considerations, the relative aggressiveness of the parties,
and external constitutional doctrines. See Woods, supra note 27, at 891-98; Com-
ment, Unified Jurisdictional Test Applied to In Personam Jurisdiction, 1978
WAsH. U.L.Q. 797, 802-04.
49. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Simpkins v.
Council Mfg. Corp., 332 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1964). But see St. Clair v. Righter,
250 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Va. 1966) (long-arm statute held not appropriate butjurisdiction extended to the limit of due process even if such assumption of
latent power was not authorized by statute).
50. The contact with the state can be insufficient either for lack of compli-
ance with state law or for due process reasons. Following a traditional canon of
construction, the interpretation of the state law will be resolved first so as to
avoid the constitutional question if possible.
51. Establishing equivalent state law and due process limits is commonly
accomplished by either of two methods. In the first, the court by statutory interpre-
tation finds that the intent of the legislature was to extend the long-arm statute
to such limits. See Hass v. Fancher Furniture Co., 156 F. Supp. 564, 567 (N.D.
Ill. 1957); Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976). The
Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559, 563 (1980), not-
ed that while "the proper approach was to test jurisdiction against both statutory
and constitutional standards, [the Oklahoma court's] analysis did not distinguish
these questions, probably because [the statute in question] had been interpreted
as conferring jurisdiction to the limits permitted" by due process. In the second
method, the legislature explicitly adopts a constitutional limit statute. See, e.g.,
ARiz. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1); CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
52. The labeling process is exemplified in RSMo § 351.633 (1978), which
states that a foreign corporation which commits a tort in whole or in part in
Missouri impliedly consents to personal jurisdiction. This statute provides prob-
ably the easiest way for the plaintiff to establish jurisdiction over a foreign cor-
poration as no fairness test is required. See Comment, Expanding Permissible
Bases of Jurisdiction in Missouri: The New Long-Arm Statute, 33 Mo. L. REV.
248, 257 (1968). This statute by its terms does not apply to libel and slander
actions; it is an implied consent statute. See Scheidegger v. Greene, 451 S.W.2d
135, 138 (Mo. 1970) (RSMo § 351.633 (1978) is a fiction; RSMo § 506.500 (1978),
the commonly used Missouri long-arm statute, is not). See also Adams Dairy Co.
v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 293 F. Supp. 1135 (W.D. Mo. 1968). Shaffer, by
requiring a fairness test, may affect the application of § 351.633 but such an
effect would be negligible because the requirements of the statute probably con-
stitute a reasonable defendant-forum contact. See Deere &c Co. v. Pinnell, 454
S.W.2d 889, 893 (Mo. En Banc 1970), where the court held that the contact
listed in § 351.633 also meets the requirements of the minimum contacts test. This
might affect the statute's classification as one of implied consent.
[Vol. 45
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might accurately be described as the "straining process." Upon deciding
that jurisdiction is reasonably established in certain fact situations, cate-
gories of reasonable forum-defendant connections are created. Examples
include "transacting business" or "engaging in tortious activity." A court
will then strain a new fact situation in order to attach such labels, borrow-
ing from their prejudged and already incorporated reasonableness. Ad-
vertising, -for instance, becomes "transacting business" 58
This process expands with the incorporation of these categories into
a long-arm statute. At this point, the "straining process" becomes necessary
to establish statutory compliance. The problem reaches a peak as the due
process limits for obtaining jurisdiction extend beyond the state's statutory
limits. Additional judicial straining is required to place fact situations
that establish sufficient connections under liberal due process limits within
the requirements listed by the previously adequate but now outdated
statutes.5 4 Such straining, however, establishes statutory compliance and
by judicial interpretation extends the reach of the statute to the limits
allowed by International Shoe. What surfaces in the case law is a dis-
posal of minimum contacts questions by a labeling process based upon
stare decisis, rather than by a case-by-case analysis using a fairness test.65
The courts return to a use of fictions, a process the contacts test sought
to avoid.56
With this general framework in mind, the effect of the Sperandio I
53. See Danforth v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 527 S.W.2d 355 (Mo. En Banc
1975) (promotional activity held to be a reasonable contact). The effect of the
labeling process upon the fairness test is illustrated by REsTATFAMENT (SECOND) OF
CoNFucr OF LAWS § 35 (1971). The fairness test is omitted if the defendant is
doing business in the state. Id. The fairness test also is omitted if the cause of
action is a tort arising out of an act committed in the state, but a fairness test is
retained if a non-tort action arises out of a similar act. Id. § 36.
54. The Missouri long-arm statute, RSMo § 506.500 (1978), incorporates
five such requirements. See notes 60-62 and accompanying text infra. When the
Missouri legislature adopted § 506.500 in 1967, it arguably was trying to extend
its jurisdictional reach. It adopted an almost verbatim copy of what was then
a liberal Illinois statute. State Senator Waters stated, "This law is represented
as being virtually identical to a similar law adopted by the State of Illinois which,
it is said, has been held to be constitutional." Waters, State Legislative Develop-
ments, 23 J. Mo. BAR 452, 455 (1967). Subsequent liberal interpretations of the
due process requirements, however, have left the statute burdensome and re-
strictive.
55. Two patterns of analysis appear in states that do not have constitutional
limit statutes. The first is to find that the statutory requirements are constitutional.
In subsequent cases, then, the courts will fit the fact situation within the statute's
limits. The second method is illustrated in First Nat'l Bank v. Ward, 380 F. Supp.
782 (W.D. Mo. 1974). After the statute's requirements are analyzed, the fairness
test is used regardless of whether the statute previously has been held to be con-
stitutional.
56. To use advertising as an example, some jurisdictions would use the
straining process to attach the label of transacting business. In a state with a
constitutional limit statute, however, the advertising would establish a defendant-
forum contact. Its business nature would then be a factor weighted in favor of
establishing jurisdiction when the fairness test was applied.
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and II decisions upon. the Missouri personal jurisdiction. doctrine now
will be analyzed. The alleged connection between Pemberton, the de-
fendant, and Missouri, upon which jurisdiction was to attach, was the
letter from Pemberton to Dr. Michael. The court in both decisions utilized
the effects test while discussing this contact: Sperandio I noted that Pem-
berton's acts caused an effect in Missouri; 57 Sperandio II. stated that. an
effect took place in Missouri.58 Recognition of the effects test approachis
.important. The Missouri Supreme Court refused to apply the straining
process to find that Pemberton had committed an act within Missouri..The
implications of this approach can be shown in a discussion of Missouri's
,statutory requirements.
The Missouri long-arm statute used in both Sperandio I and II was
Mo. Rev. Stat. section. 506.500. 59 Section 506.500 is a single-act statute
which can be used to acquire jurisdiction over individuals, corporations,
and their agents. Its use is available to resident and nonresident plaintiffs.
The statute limits the scope of Missouri's jurisdiction by establishing
specific jurisdiction and enumerating five acts through which jurisdiction
.can, attach:60 the transaction of any business within the state, the making
of any contract within the state,61 the commission of a tortious act within
the state, the ownership of real estate within the state, and- contracting to
insure within the state.6 2
Fears of a conservative interpretation of the statute63. were. laid to
57. 568 S.W.2d at 936.
58. 581 S.W.2d at 383.
59. RSMo § 506.510 (1978) provides for service of process upon the defendant
outside Missouri. RSMo § 506.520 (1978) provides the power for a court to renderjudgment against defendants subject to jurisdiction established by RSMo § 506.500
(1978).
60. In applying the statute, the nature of the alleged forum-defendant con-
tact and not the plaintiff's claim is determinative. The five categories dictate
what connections are available. The only restriction upon the plaintiff's claim is
that it arise out of a permitted contact. Thus, numerous claims arising out of a
defendant's business transaction have been allowed. Fulton v. Chicago,. R.I. &
Pac. R.R., 481 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1973) (Carmack Amendment claim, a statutory
action for property damaged during interstate transportation by a common
carrier); Stith v. Manor Baking Co., 418 F. Supp. 150 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (em-
ployment discrimination claim); Hitt v. Nisson Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. 838(S.D. Fla. 1975) (antitrust action). See also Apco Oil Corp. v. Turpin, 490
S.W.2d 400 (Mo. App., St. L. 1973) (allowing indemnity claim arising out of a
tortious act committed within the state). Furthermore, the connection need not
be between the parties to the lawsuit. See id. at 407 (the tortious activity need
not be committed upon the person bringing the cause of action).
61. No contract connection appears in the Illinois statute. The Illinois courts
have interpreted such connections to be encompassed by the "transaction of any
business" clause.
62. This connection is a codification of McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
63. Such fears were described in Comment, supra note 52, at 251. The author
noted past decisions in which the Missouri courts appeared to apply a restrictive
approach to the contacts test. For an analysis of pre-adoption cases, see Anderson,
Personal Jurisdiction Over Outsiders, 28 Mo. L. Rav. 336 (1963). But see Adams
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rest as courts attempted to equate its reach with that allowed by due
process.6 4 In doing so, however, the straining process appeared. A tortious
act within the state has been defined to include acts committed by the
defendant outside Missouri with tortious consequences in Missouri even
if the defendant's activity was totally extraterritorial. 6 5 Transacting busi-
ness has included signing a promissory note,66 attending a business con-
ference in Missouri, 67 and participating in promotional activity -within the
state.6 8
The "within the state" language also has caused problems. The desire
to meet this statutory requirement has led to analyses such as showing that
a contract is formed upon acceptance, that acceptance occurred by letter
or phone conversation, and that such letters or calls were conveyed from
Missouri.6 9 Even when the contract had not been executed within Mis-
souri or negotiated by the defendant or her agent, jurisdiction still would
attach. One decision noted that the out-of-state signing of the agreement
adopted and ratified the in-state negotiations which had led to the con-
tract. 70
Dairy Co. v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 293 F. Supp. 1135, 1155 n.26 (W.D. Mo.1968), where Judge Oliver contended that this past conservative stance was infact due to a lack of an adequate long-arm statute upon which the courts could
act. This judicial restraint probably led to the adoption in 1967 of RSMo§ 506.500 (1978).
64. The following cases illustrate the liberal jurisdictional attitude adoptedby the Missouri courts: Deere & Co. v. Pinnell, 454 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Mo. EnBanc 1970) (RSMo § 506.500 held to be constitutional); Slivka v. Hackldey, 418S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1967) (in an action to enforce an Illinois judgment, the courtheld that the Illinois statute was constitutional); Nichols v. Fuller, 449 S.W.2d11, 14 (Mo. App., St. L. 1969) (the near verbatim adoption of the Illinois
statute comes with a presumption of that state's construction).
65. Fulton v. Southern Pac. Co., 320 F. Supp. 45 (W.D. Mo. 1975) (Texas
resident suing a Minnesota corporation in Missouri for negligently loading a trainin Minnesota leading to damage while passing through Missouri); Deere & Co.
v. Pinnell, 454 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. En Banc 1970) (defective product sold in Mis-
souri); Apco Oil Corp. v. Turpin, 490 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. App., St. L. 1973) (de-fective product sold in Missouri). Bank of Gering v. Schoenlaub, 540 S.W.2d 31(Mo. En Banc 1976), may impose a limit to this approach. The court in Bank ofGering found jurisdiction lacking. In discussing a possible "actionable conse-quences" approach, the court implied that at least the injury must occur in
Missour.
66. First Nat'l Bank v. Ward, 380 F. Supp. 782 (W.D. Mo. 1974).67. American Hoechst Corp. v. Bandy Labs., Inc., 332 F. Supp. 241 (W.D.
Mo. 1974).
68. Danforth v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 527 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. En Banc
1975).
69. Servco Equip. Co. v. C.M. Lingle Co., 487 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. App., St. L.
1972).
70. Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Elliott, 560 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977).Accord, Peoples Bank v. Stussie, 536 S.W.2d 934 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976) (courtheld that the defendant had become subject to jurisdiction under the statute by
accepting the benefits which resulted directly from contacts made with Missouri
by a second defendant's agent). Such attempts by the court to establish jurisdictionby aggregating the defendants together to determine jurisdictional questions maybe unconstitutional. Rush v. Savchuk, 100 S. Ct. 571 (1980), struck down such an
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The effects test arguably developed from such strained decisions-
notably in product liability cases. In most cases a strained application of
the Missouri statute and the effects test will reach the same conclusions.
The latter, however, requires only an out-of-state act causing an in-state
effect. The Missouri statute requires an in-state act, which is further
qualified by the five enumerated categories.
In both Sperandio I and II, the Missouri Supreme Court refused to
use the strained approach to find either establishment of a contact or
statutory compliance.7 ' It chose instead to establish minimum contacts by
the effects test and found statutory compliance by interpreting the long-
arm statute to have a reach equal to that allowed by due process. In holding
that the "ultimate objective of § 506.500 'was to extend the jurisdiction of
this state over nonresident defendants to that extent permissible under
the Due Process Clause,' "72 the court endorsed a "constitutional limit"
statute like those in California and Rhode Island.73
The Sperandio II decision potentially expands the scope of personal
jurisdiction in Missouri.7 4 Establishing one of the five categories of sec-
effort by a Minnesota court. The Court held that the assertion of jurisdiction
over one defendant based solely upon the acts of another is plainly unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 579.
71. The court, however, did revert to the old statutory compliance rules
when it disposed of the conspiracy claim. Citing Hardy v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 19 II. App. 2d 75, 153 N.E.2d 269 (1958), a conspiracy case, the court
noted, in language that appeared confined to the conspiracy count, that the
plaintiff did not allege a tortious act. 581 S.W.2d at 384. It is unclear why language
of this type is absent in the discussion of the first claim.
72. 581 S.W.2d at 380-81, quoting from Deere & Co. v. Pinnell, 454 S.W.2d
889, 892 (Mo. En Banc 1970). The language quoted from Deere by Sperandio I
and 1I arguably was used to justify the extension of the tortious activity category
to the due process limits set by Illinois courts which had applied a tortious
consequences test. See also Danforth v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 527 S.W.2d
355 (Mo. En Banc 1975), where the court quoted Deere and then held promo-
tional activity to be within the transacting business category.
73. For a discussion of how this can be accomplished, see note 51 and ac-
companying text supra. There is precedent in Missouri for the use of this method
to equate statutory and due process limits. See Fulton v. Chicago, R.I. 9: Pac.
R.R., 481 F.2d 326, 34 n.5 (8th Cir. 1973), where the court stated that Missouri
could also adopt the approaches of Illinois and Tennessee and avoid a 'pe-
dantic quibbling with the wording of the statute.'" This approach was abandoned,
however, because the court found tortious activity within Missouri. In Stith
v. Manor Baking Co., 418 F. Supp. 150 (W.D. Mo. 1976), the expansive method
was fully implemented. The federal court, quoting Fulton and Danforth, made
no effort to establish the statute's five categories. Instead it proceeded immediately
to due process considerations.
74. Sperandio II's potential expansion of the statute also suggests the demise
of a Missouri jurisdictional tradition. In this respect the approach utilized by
the Sperandio cases should be contrasted with that of Mercantile Nat'l Bank v.
Rooney, 402 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. En Banc 1966). In Rooney, the Missouri Supreme
Court held that any "change in the rule that service of process beyond the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the court is ineffective to confer jurisdiction in personam
over the person served is dependent upon valid legislative action." Id. at 357.
The court "cannot supply that which the legislature has, either deliberately,
inadvertently, or through lack of foresight, omitted from the controlling statutes."
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tion 506.500 probably no longer is crucial in pleading75 or dispositive in
litigation. The court instead will proceed directly to a due process in-
quiry. Adoption of this approach will be of special importance in those
cases brought in the federal courts in Missouri. These courts are required
to follow the Missouri interpretation of section 506.500 to determine the
extent of their personal jurisdictional reach.j 6 The definition of the due
process limits of jurisdiction, however, is not controlled by the Missouri
courts. Thus, the approach to questions such as the use of special factors
in the fairness test,77 absent a United States Supreme Court decision,
largely will depend upon how the federal courts apply the minimum con-
tacts test.
The "purposeful" language of Hanson was recognized in both Sper-
andio 1 and II1,8 but application of this requirement led to differing re-
sults. Sperandio I found Pemberton's acts to be purposeful; Sperandio I1
did not.79 Sperandio I noted that Pemberton had knowledge that his letter
would be used in Sperandio's operation; 0 Sperandio II stated that nothing
in the record indicated Pemberton knew his suggested technique would
be followed.8 1 It also appears that in both decisions the court incorporated
the knowledge and purposeful requirements as part of the fairness test.
In doing so, the court did not use the approach adopted later by Woodson
Id. at 362. See also Adams Dairy Co. v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 293 F. Supp.
1135 (W.D. Mo. 1968). "[Flor reasons that have not been articulated, the
Supreme Court of Missouri, contrary to the practice in the federal courts and
those of some other states, has elected to await legislative action in regard to
extraterritorial service of process rather than exercise the rule making power
delegated it under the Missouri Constitution." Id. at 1157 n.27.
75. That which must be pleaded is uncertain. Fulton v. Southern Pac. Co.,
320 F. Supp. 45 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (complaint must allege one or more of the
enumerated grounds); Empiregas, Inc. v. Hoover Ball &: Bearing Co., 507 S.W.2d
567 (Mo. 1974) (petition must be examined to determine if service of process is
proper); Peoples Bank v. Stussie, 536 S.W.2d 934 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976) (hearing
to quash is limited to an evaluation of the defendant's contacts and a prima
fade showing that the acts contemplated by the statute took place); Birdsboro
Corp. v. Kimberlin, 461 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. App., K.C. 1970) (allegation of general
negligence is sufficient).
76. While the states may formulate rules governing jurisdiction over out-of-
state persons, the determination of federal due process requirements is a question
of federal law. Jennings v. McCall Corp., 320 F.2d 64, 67 (8th Cir. 1963). The
question of whether federal court personal jurisdiction is determined by state or
federal law is widely debated. See Annot., 6 A.L.R.8d 1103 (1966). The Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that state law is controlling. Jennings
v. McCall Corp., 320 F.2d 64, 67 (8th Cir. 1963) (if due process limits are
met the state law controls as to questions such as what constitutes doing busi-
ness). See also Simpkins v. Council Mfg. Corp., 332 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1964).
77. For a list of several fairness factors, see note 48 supra.
78. 568 S.W.2d at 937 ("Pemberton's acts were performed for the purpose
of causing an effect."). Sperandio I1 noted that Kulko recognized the purposeful
language. 581 S.W.2d at 382. It added that Pemberton did not purposefully
avail himself of conducting activities within the forum state. Id. at 383.
79. See note 78 supra.
80. 568 S.W.2d at 936.
81. 581 S.W.2d at 382.
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where the United States Supreme Court incorporated the Hanson require-
ment as a separate analytical step.8 2
The fairness test was implemented in both cases. Sperandio II noted
that the ultimate question in determining the existence of personal juris-
diction is one of reasonableness.8 3 Previous Missouri cases have noted five
factors to be weighed in this test: the nature and quality of the contacts
with the forum state, the quantity of the contacts with the forum state,
the interest of Missouri in providing a forum for its residents, the rela-
tionship of the cause of action to the contact, and the convenience of the
parties.8 4 These categories have been further subdivided. The nature of
the contact includes the directness of the contact, who invoked it, and
whether the defendant reasonably could anticipate consequences in the
forum state.8 5 The quality of the connection encompasses the relative
importance of the contact to the whole transaction between the parties.8 6
In one case, the court included several factors in its discussion of the
nature, quantity, and quality of the contact: whether the defendant
purposely availed himself of the. privilege of conducting activities within
the forum state by entering into a transaction having an impact'on the
commerce of that state; whether the plaintiff initiated the negotiations;
whether, if the plaintiff had initiated the contact, the defendant actively
had participated in it; the defendant's knowledge of the transaction; how
much activity actually had occurred in the forum state; and the- value
and number of the contacts. 87
Sperandio I, in finding the contact sufficient to establish jurisdiction,
noted that Missouri had an interest in securing redress for its citizens who
had been injured in Missouri and who had had no contact with Utah.
The court concluded that the defendant Pemberton knew that his sug-
gestions would be used in the plaintiff's operation, and he,. therefore,
performed an act with the purpose of causing an effect in Missouri.
Sperandio II, in holding that the contact was insufficient, applied a
82. See notes 41-43 and accompanying text supra. Cases prior to Sperandio I
and I1 applied varying requirements with regard to the purposeful language. Stith
v. Manor Baking Co., 418 F. Supp. 150 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (sufficient that a product
would be used in Missouri); Bank of Gering v. Schoenlaub, 540 S.W.2d 31 (Mo.
En Banc 1976) (majority and dissent reached opposite conclusions with regard
to applying the purposeful language); Apco Oil Co. v. Turpin, 490 S.W.2d 400
(Mo. App., St. L. 1973) (knowledge that an effect would occur in Missouri);
Birdsboro Corp. v. Kimberlin, 461 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. App., K.C. 1970) (reasonable
anticipation that its acts would subject it to the jurisdiction of the state'and federal
courts).
83. 581 S.W.2d at 383.
84. See, e.g., Peoples Bank v. Stussie, 536 S.W.2d 934 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976).
85. Gardner Eng'r Corp. v. Page Eng'r Co., 484 F.2d 27 (8th Cir. 1973).
86. American Hoechst Corp. v. Bandy Labs., Inc., 332 F. Supp. 241 (W.D.
Mo. 1974).
87. 581 S.W.2d at 381 (discussion of the facts considered in Kulko).
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broader fairness test. The court, noting the several factors used in Kulko88
to determine reasonableness and with the Sperandio I factors in mind,
stated that the letter had been unsolicited, no financial benefit had been
sought, no fee had been paid or solicited, no doctor-patient relationship
had existed, and the defendant had not known that his technique would
be followed. The court concluded that the defendant had not purpose-
fully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within Mis-
souri.
The court, noting that Sperandio II resembled other doctor cases in
which the effects test requirements had been met, but in which reasonable
connections had not been established,89 distinguished this case from
product liability cases. 9 0 The court observed that Pemberton had not been
the operating physician and that Sperandio had not been his patient, The
,correspondence between the doctors had been an exchange of opinion and
,not the treatment of patients by mail. The state's interest in deterring the
conduct exhibited by Pemberton was not as great as if the doctor-patient
relationship had existed-
The case also recognized a factor that is becoming increasingly im-
portant in other states. The language stating that the letter had been
unsolicited and a fee had not been sought recognized that if the plaintiff
is the one who had initiated the contact, jurisdiction might not exist
unless the defendant's participation in the contact had been active."'
The Sperandio cases Will have an important impact upon Missouri's
future personal jurisdiction requirements. Ease of attaining jurisdiction
may be expanded if the court's language, endorsing a constitutional limit
statute and recognizing the effects test, is applied. This expansion will,
however, be checked because the court recognized the use of a pervasive
fairness test with several balancing factors.
PHILLIP C. ROUSE
88. Id. at 383. The court cites Wright v. Yackley, 459 F.2d 287 (9th Cir.
1972) (court emphasized that the state's interest in deterring such interstate con-
duct is an important factor of the fairness test).
89. Examples of product liability cases include Gray v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1971); Nelson v.
Miller, 11 IUI. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
90. Lakeside Bridge &c Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., Inc., 597
F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979); Electro-Craft Corp. v. Maxwell Elec. Corp., 417 F.2d
365 (8th Cir. 1969); American Hoechst Corp. v. Bandy Labs., Inc., 332 F. Supp.
241 (W.D. Mo. 1975). 1
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